![]()  | 
            |||||
Just Above Sunset 
               June 27, 2004: Deconstructionist Semantics Used to Explain When a Lie is Not a Lie 
                | 
            |||||
| 
               
               
                Matthew Yglesias has an
                  interesting column up this week over on The American Prospect that attempts a political application of Paul
                  Grice's theory of "conversational implicature” of all things.   What a speaker implicates is distinct from what he says and from what his words imply.  Saying of an expensive dinner, "It was edible," implicates that it was mediocre at best.  This simple example illustrates a general phenomenon: a speaker can say one thing and manage to mean something
                  else or something more by exploiting the fact that he may be presumed to be cooperative, in particular, to be speaking truthfully,
                  informatively, relevantly, and otherwise appropriately.  The listener relies on
                  this presumption to make a contextually driven inference from what the speaker says to what she means. The prose is dense so Yglesias
                  unpacks it.   For our purposes, the point is that a canny speaker can mislead his audience without necessarily
                  saying anything false.  If I tell you, "they're not all in the meeting yet" when,
                  in fact, no one is in the meeting, I haven't lied to you about anything.  If
                  no one is there, then, indeed, they're not all there.  Nevertheless, any
                  reasonable listener will have understood me to mean that some, but not all, of the expected attendees are then.  Again, if I say, "some people are in the room" when only one person is in the room, I'm not speaking falsely,
                  I'm simply speaking uncooperatively.  You'll infer that more than one person is
                  in the room although, strictly speaking, I said no such thing. This is, of course, splitting
                  semantic hairs (or some such metaphor).   For the purposes of defending oneself against perjury charges in a quasi-criminal proceeding,
                  this sort of argument may suffice.  In Bush's case, however, perjury is not on
                  the table.  Rather, the question is whether or not he has led the American people
                  in a responsible manner.  In this context the important issue is not
                  whether the administration's various claims can, when taken one by one, somehow be defined as factual.  The relevant question is whether or not the picture they sketched enhanced or detracted from
                  the public's understanding of the major issues of the day.  Various assertions
                  about ties between Iraq and al-Qaeda must, therefore, be put into the broader context of what the administration was saying
                  about the war.  This broad picture included the claim that the invasion of Iraq
                  was an act of preemptive self-defense, that Saddam Hussein was a threat to the United States, that the Iraq War was part of
                  the war on terrorism, that the desire to invade was motivated by the sense that the country had waited too long before responding
                  vigorously to al-Qaeda, and that the lessons of 9-11 were an important factor in the president's thought process. I added the emphases in
                  bold here to show Yglesias is reframing the question.  Bush and Cheney defenders
                  are absolutely right.  These two did not exactly lie.  But the question Yglesias is suggesting everyone ask is this – Were they acting responsibly?  Don’t call them liars.  That’s
                  a dead end.  Ask instead if they were doing the right thing, the responsible thing,
                  in their semantic efforts to get us all excited and ready to go to war.   The point of all this was to lead the American people to believe that the invasion of Iraq was
                  part of the war on terrorism in a rather straightforward sense: Saddam Hussein was likely to give al-Qaeda weapons of mass
                  destruction for use against the United States.  Though many voices put forward
                  many arguments for war in the months before the beginning of the invasion, this was the main case put forward by the
                  administration.  Not that we needed to invade to avenge a meeting that took place
                  years ago in Khartoum, but that the long-past Khartoum meeting was evidence of the continuing likelihood that Iraq would become
                  a WMD supplier for al-Qaeda. We made the assumption
                  this was all straightforward.  Bush and Cheney, and Powell at the UN, just plopped
                  down items.  We connected them.  Our
                  bad.  Not Bush’s fault.   Simply put, there was never any evidence whatsoever to back up the administration's theory on
                  this point.  We know that in the past Saddam has simultaneously sponsored terrorist
                  groups (directed against Israel) and possessed WMD (in the form of chemical weapons), but that he never gave such weapons
                  to terrorists because he didn't trust them.  We also know that in the past
                  Saddam has passed up on the opportunity to use WMD against American forces, out of fear for what the retaliation would mean
                  for his regime.  We know -- as the 9-11 Commission has recently reiterated and
                  the administration has reluctantly admitted -- that Iraq never had an operational relationship with al-Qaeda and never cooperated
                  with them on attacks against the United States or any other country.  Last, but
                  by no means least, we know that Iraq's ties with al-Qaeda were less significant than al-Qaeda's ties with such American
                  allies as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.  None of the scattered data points
                  the administration's defenders now wish to point to -- a few inconclusive meetings, and an ambiguous relationship between
                  Iraq and Abu Zarqawi (whose relationship with al-Qaeda is, likewise, ambiguous) -- even begins to support the assertion that
                  Iraqi WMD and al-Qaeda terrorism constituted any sort of symbiotic threat to the country. 
                   But we bought the assertion
                  of a threat.   That the administration is bothering to pretend they never said any such thing is a testament
                  to how little they respect the intelligence of the American people, and how confident they are that the media will
                  not point out facts that can be found in plain sight.  What, exactly, was
                  the purpose of constant references to Iraqi sponsorship of anti-Israeli terrorism that never came with the qualifier that
                  this was anti-Israeli, rather than anti-American terrorism?  Why note that
                  Qaeda-affiliated groups were operating "in Iraq" without mentioning that they operated in the part of Iraq outside of Saddam's
                  control?  Why call Iraq "the central front in the war on terrorism?" Why cite
                  "September the eleventh" as a motivating factor for war?  The answer is obvious:
                  The administration wished the American people to believe that the government of Iraq was complicit – if not in 9-11
                  itself -- then in al-Qaeda terrorism in general.  If the war was preemptive, and
                  part of the war on terrorism, then what was it supposed to preempt if not a terrorist attack? 
                   Yep, they knew we were
                  scared, and easy prey – prime suckers.  And they knew the news media didn’t
                  want to be called unpatriotic for calling them on any of this nonsense.  The press
                  would roll.  They knew that.   As the president put it in September 2002, "the danger is, is that they work in concert.  The danger is, is that al-Qaeda becomes an extension of Saddam's madness and his hatred
                  and his capacity to extend weapons of mass destruction around the world."  Technically speaking, the president didn't
                  say he had any evidence that this would happen, so the fact that there was no evidence it was likely to happen doesn't
                  show that he was lying.   And it does seem no one
                  wanted to see any evidence that this would happen.  We didn’t need
                  to.  We were scared.  We could imagine
                  it might.  And the press did not want to call our leaders on any of this.  The price was far too high.   … if he wasn't trying to mislead people, then he and his administration are simply in the
                  grips of a paranoid worldview -- leaping at wholly imagined threats and throwing tens of thousands of soldiers and Marines
                  into battle.  Under the circumstances, I find the theory that the president is
                  a liar relatively comforting.  I'd be more comfortable still if he simply stopped
                  saying things that aren't true.   Yep, better we assume Bush
                  is irresponsibly misleading us, a lying a bit here and there.  The idea the he
                  and his crew are just plain old paranoid maniacs is unacceptable, something we don’t want to believe.    | 
            ||||
| 
               
               
               
               	
               
                
 
                   This issue updated and published on...
                   
               
 Paris readers add nine hours....
                   
               
 
  | 
            ||||